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Introduction 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent an ambitious and explicit 
commitment by the international community to reduce poverty, pledging inter alia to 
reduce by half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015. Virtually 
all bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have adopted poverty reduction as their 
overriding objective. Similarly, governments in poor countries have placed poverty 
reduction at the top of their agendas. Yet, despite the grand rhetoric, progress on the 
ground appears slow; some countries are even regressing. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that democratic governance is both a right in itself and a means of ensuring basic 
human rights observance. As pointed out by the Human Development Report 2002, 
responsiveness and accountability are critical missing elements in our understanding 
of the relationship between the powerful elites and the disempowered poor who are 
asserting their rights.1 In this paper we pose the following question of research: How 
do we increase the responsiveness of decision-makers to the concerns of the poor and 
hold them accountable for their commitment to reduce poverty? In order to lay a 
foundation for a constructive discussion, the paper will address three sets of questions: 
1. What do we mean by the terms “poverty”, “responsiveness” and 
“accountability”? 
2 Who are the actors – at various levels and in different spheres – expected to be 
responsive to the concerns of the poor and accountable for their commitment to 
reducing poverty?  
3. What mechanisms, institutions, procedures, and interventions may enhance the 
responsiveness and accountability of the various agents to poverty reduction?  
 
1. Poverty, Responsiveness and Accountability 
The concepts of “poverty”, “responsiveness” and “accountability” form the focal 
points of the workshop deliberations and their meaning in this context needs to be 
clarified at the outset.  
1.1 Poverty 
This paper has adopted the human development approach to poverty espoused by the 
UNDP. Poverty is viewed as a multidimensional concept including deprivation (of 
income and the basic means of livelihood and well-being) as well as vulnerability and 
powerlessness (arising from both lack of knowledge and opportunities for 
participation).2 The international community appears to have reached this consensus 
on conceptualising poverty, which informs the MDGs. 
 
Poverty viola tes basic human rights, and gives rise to moral and in some cases legal 
claims on the part of the poor. It also imposes moral and legal obligations on a range 
                                                 
1 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
2 Even in cases of no immediate deprivation, the lack of reasonable security for the future is in itself a 
serious limitation on a person’s capabilities. According to Amartya Sen, ‘capabilities’ are the ability to 
achieve functionings, that is to achieve the things a person can be or do in life that he or she has reason 
to value. Sen’s capability concept underpins UNDP’s ‘human development’ approach and the Human 
Development Index, which measures poverty in terms of longevity (life expectancy at birth), 
knowledge (level of education), and income (BNP per capita). See Amartya Sen, Development as 
Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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of actors at local, national and international levels. This is most clear-cut in cases of 
severe poverty. It should be discussed, however, whether there are different levels of 
accountability corresponding to varying depths of poverty.  
1.2 Responsiveness and Voice 
Responsiveness refers to the way in which a given decision-maker – public or private 
– perceives the needs and responds to the demands of particular groups, such as the 
poor. Responsiveness to poverty concerns are determined by several factors: 
 
¨ The political and organisational culture (whether the interests of the poor are 
acknowledged as legitimate and just); 
¨ The salience of the pro-poor mandate or the relative prominence of poverty 
concerns on the agenda of the decision-makers; 
¨ The weight of the poor relative to other interest groups and the incentive to 
address their concerns, i.e. the political cost of ignoring the poor as a constituency; 
¨ The ability of decision-making agencies to comprehend the concerns of the poor, 
and to plan and implement policy in response to them, i.e. the organisational 
capacity of decision-makers. 
 
In addition to the above factors characterising the decision-makers, the response to 
poverty issues depends on the strength of the impetus received: how well are the 
concerns articulated? Factors bearing on the voice of the poor include: 
  
¨ The legal basis of poverty reduction, i.e. to what extent are the rights of the poor 
to be non-poor embedded in legal instruments? 
¨ The ability of the poor and their advocates to articulate their concerns 
(information, knowledge and organisational capacity at the grassroots level); 
¨ The institutional channels and arenas for effectively voicing these concerns 
(elections, hearings, litigation, participatory policy-making processes, lobbying, 
media). 
1.3 Accountability 
Accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim 
and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right by acting 
or desisting from particular actions. The most basic form of an accountability relation 
is that between a person or agency entrusted with a particular task or certain powers or 
resources, on the one hand, and the ‘principal’ on whose behalf the task is undertaken, 
on the other. In this paper we are concerned with accountability relations between the 
poor and agents with explicit commitments to reduce poverty.  
 
A duty to be accountable can be discharged in different ways, but all accountability 
mechanisms operate according to one, or a combination of, the following logics:3 
 
¨ “Transparency” requires that decisions and actions are taken openly and that 
sufficient information is available so that other agencies and the general public 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of accountability see Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), 
The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 
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can assess whether the relevant procedures are followed, consonant with the 
given mandate; 
¨ “Answerability” means an obligation on the part of the decision-makers to justify 
their decisions publicly so as to substantiate that they are reasonable, rational and 
within their mandate; 
¨ “Controllability” refers to mechanisms in place to sanction actions and decisions 
that run counter to given mandates and procedures – often referred to as a system 
of checks and balances or enforcement mechanisms. The checks may take many 
forms, including shaming and praise. Impunity is the antonym of accountability 
and apportioning blame for harm done is an important component of 
accountability. 
 
Although voice, responsiveness and accountability are interlinked elements of an 
effective approach to poverty reduction, it should be noted that they also refer to 
separate processes, each with their own dynamics. It is useful, therefore, to 
disaggregate the process into its constituent parts and to focus systematically on each 
aspect. The voice-responsiveness-accountability typology allows us to acknowledge 
the overall complexity of the problem at hand, while facilitating a systematic focus on 
the key actors and mechanisms:  
 
a) Voice. Attention needs to be focused on how the concerns of the poor are 
articulated and expressed, and how their articulation can be made more effective. 
Questions to address include: What are the central agents and organisations? How 
to facilitate empowerment and organisational capacity among the poor, through 
community-based organisations and NGOs? What are the most important arenas 
for articulating the interests and demands of the poor? How to establish effective 
institutional channels for the poor to voice their concerns and to create 
opportunities for broader participation? 
b) Responsiveness. We need to identify mechanisms for making agencies at various 
levels more responsive to the voice of the poor. Key questions include: How can 
we broaden the space for poverty concerns on the agenda? How can we add to the 
weight of the poor relative to other interest groups? Are the political culture and 
professional norms of the decision-makers receptive in this regard and how can 
they be made more sensitive? How to strengthen the ability of the decision-makers 
to comprehend poverty concerns and to plan and implement policy in response to 
them? 
c) Accountability. Finally, we need to identify and create mechanisms for holding 
agents accountable for their decisions, priorities, policies and faults of omission as 
they bear on poverty. Such mechanisms should be sustainable and capable of 
being institutionalised. They may relate predominantly to transparency, such as 
systematic reporting on the poverty profile of public spending; to answerability, 
by instituting consultation procedures giving all affected parties a right to be 
heard; or to controllability, by introducing court- like structures of sanctioning.  
 
The complexity of the challenge facing the actors tasked with amplifying the voice of 
the poor and enhancing responsiveness and accountability with a view to honouring 
the commitment made to poverty reduction must be acknowledged. The process is 
likely to be time-consuming. Contemporary power relations are founded on legal and 
social structures buttressed by formal and informal mechanisms. The position of the 
nation-state – the conventional focus of accountability relationships – is currently 
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challenged by global forces and in some instances by the criminalisation of the state. 
Even where formal democratic structures are in place, many developing nations are 
grappling with large-scale corruption, organised crime, drug trafficking, and human 
security issues. In addition to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, these factors hamper any 
polity’s attempts to secure a voice for poor and marginalised groups. In addition, the 
prevailing political culture and the political will of key actors to redress the plight of 
the poor are probably as important as the formal institutional mechanisms. 
 
2. Actors to be made responsive to the concerns of the poor and 
accountable for their commitment to reduce poverty  
Who owes accountability for the reduction of poverty? This applies most clearly to 
those institutions and actors whose mandate includes poverty reduction or are 
otherwise committed to the same goal. The greater the ability of these institutions to 
effect positive change, the greater their obligation to be accountable. It should also be 
discussed whether a moral obligation to be accountable  to the poor applies generally 
to all those who are in a position of power in the sense that their decisions, action and 
non-action significantly affect the situation of the poor. Table 1 below attempts to 
map the key actors and institutions involved. 
 
Table 1: Actors accountable for poverty reduction 
 Public Civil Society Market 
International UN, IMF, World Bank, 
WTO, bilateral donors 
International NGOs, 
international media 
 
Transnational 
corporations, foreign 
investors, international 
finance 
National Governments (executive 
branch, legislature, 
judiciary and other 
institutions of restraint, 
civil service), parties 
National NGOs, 
national media,  
national 
elites/opinion leaders 
Large national 
corporations, banks, 
business and labour 
organisations 
Local Local government and 
administration, local 
parties 
Community based 
organisations, NGOs, 
local media, and 
elites  
Local businesses, 
financial institutions, 
business chambers, 
local organised labour 
 
The obligation to be responsive and accountable for poverty reduction applies, first 
and foremost, to those mandated to govern on behalf of society. This category 
comprises all the actors and institutions listed in the ‘public’ column above: political 
leaders (with legislative and/or executive functions), ‘non-political’ public officers 
(members of the judiciary, ombudsmen, ‘independent’ commissioners of various 
types), as well as the civil service at national and local levels. What sets the 
accountability obligation of these public servants apart from actors in other spheres is 
that the former (at least in a democratic society) are explicitly acting on behalf of the 
poor. They are entrusted with a mandate and the powers to implement it in accordance 
with specified rules.  
 
While the focus has predominantly been on the accountability of actors at the national 
level, the accountability and responsiveness obligations apply equally to their 
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counterparts at the international level. In the developing world public actors at the 
international level may be as influential as national governments in terms of the 
distribution of goods and services and the shaping of the social structure (which in 
turn defines the opportunity structure for the poor). The most relevant inter-
governmental organisations are the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, as 
well as regional organisations such as the AU, the ASEAN, and bilateral donors. 
 
In addition, global economic integration and political liberalisation have reshaped the 
environment in which state institutions operate and bring to the fore international, 
national and local non-state actors. The most important are international businesses 
(transnational corporations), and international civil society (international NGOs and 
international media). As indicated in Table 1, the responsiveness and accountability of 
civil society and market agents are relevant, not only at the international level but also 
nationally and locally. These actors do not have an explicit mandate ‘to serve the 
public interest’ and by implication the poor. But particularly in weak states, where the 
majority of poor people live, many non-governmental agents vastly influence the 
policies pursued. Their behaviour often bears decisively on the overall responsiveness 
and accountability of the political system to poverty reduction. 
 
3. Mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability 
Which institutional channels are most suitable for voicing the concerns of the poor? 
What is needed to give the poor a voice vis-à-vis agents at local, national and 
international levels? Turning to how, in practical terms, various agents can be made 
more responsive and accountable, we will address this question with reference to each 
set of actors enumerated above, in an attempt to identify concrete mechanisms of 
enhancing the voice of the poor, and the responsiveness and accountability of the 
decision-makers concerned. 
 
A comprehensive treatment of these complex issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
We will point to central problems and challenges, raise issues, pose questions, and 
suggest possible ways forward. The tables provide a crude map of potential 
mechanisms. In the text we highlight some of the mechanisms and provide empirical 
examples pointing to potential ways forward. 
3.1 Responsiveness and accountability of public agents at national  and 
local levels 
The nature of accountability relations varies, depending on the agents and institutions 
involved. With regard to poverty reduction, the obligation to be accountable extends 
to a wide range of agents at different levels and in various spheres of society. While 
our attention should not be limited to the political level of accountability relations 
within the nation state, this level nevertheless warrants special attention. Not only are 
important decisions taken at this level, this is, more importantly, the level at which the 
accountability mechanisms are most sophisticated. Hence, a closer look at 
accountability relations in political democracy may be a useful starting point for the 
inquiry. 
 
Democratic accountability is a particular form of accountability, whereby, in the last 
instance, ‘the people’ (however defined) hold elected representatives and public 
decision-makers to account, either directly or indirectly by empowering other 
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agencies to do so on their behalf. When elected governments fail to live up to the 
desires and expectations of the people, or act contrary to their mandate, the people can 
throw them out of office at the next election or have other agencies (courts, anti-
corruption bodies, etc) discipline them!  This may take the form of a direct vertical 
relationship, whereby the people (including the poor themselves) may hold decision-
makers to account through elections, or a horizontal relationship whereby 
accountability is exercised by public agencies acting on their behalf. 
 
Vertical accountability refers to the direct relationship between the people and their 
representatives. The most important institutions established for the purpose of vertical 
accountability are: 
 
· The electoral channel (elections and electoral institutions, political parties, 
legislatures);  
· The mass media and civil society organisations. 
 
A main challenge is to give effective voice to the poor in order to make the wielders 
of power responsive to the needs and preferences of their poor constituencies, and to 
render this relationship credible: elected representatives who do not respond 
adequately to their poor constituencies will be removed come the next election. 
 
Scepticism about the effectiveness of these vertical accountability relations – 
combined with distrust of the rationality and responsibility of the people – has 
resulted in the development of a host of horizontal accountability mechanisms in 
modern democracies. Certain entities within the state are entrusted with a 
constitutional mandate to hold other state agencies to account – thus indirectly acting 
on behalf of the people. Institutions established to ensure horizontal accountability 
include: 
 
· Constitutions, which in theory can be seen as a pact entered into by the people, 
specifying the ‘rules of the political game’ – the long-term framework of political 
and social interaction. It lays down the formal ‘power map’ of society, and 
provides the legal basis for other accountability institutions.  
· The legislative branch. Parliaments – in addition to being part of the electoral 
channel providing for vertical accountability – have an important role to play as a 
countervailing force to the power of the executive branch. 
· The judicial branch. Courts are responsible for protecting the legal rights of the 
citizenry, and for making sure that the power-holders at various levels respect the 
laws and operate within their mandates. In constitutional regimes the judiciary is 
also the primary guardian of the constitution, with responsibility for ensuring that 
legislation and executive action complies with the constitutional provisions. 
· ‘Accountability agencies’. In modern democracies a range of special state 
institutions have been established, aimed at preventing the political leadership – 
the legislators, the executive and the civil service – from misusing their power and 
exceeding their legal mandates, or to shield particularly important concerns from 
undue politicisation. The most common ‘accountability agencies’ include human 
rights commissions (HRCs); ombudsmen/public protectors; auditors-general 
(AGs); independent electoral commissions (IECs); independent central banks; 
independent revenue authorities; and anti-corruption agencies. 
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Table 2 Responsiveness and accountability of public agents at national and local levels  
 
Institutional  
Focus 
Means of strengthening the 
VOICE  
of the poor  
Mechanisms for strengthening the 
RESPONSIVENESS  
of decision-makers 
Mechanisms for strengthening the 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
of decision-makers 
National 
government 
(executive 
branch) 
- Civil and political 
rights.  
- Legal basis of social 
and economic rights 
- Free and fair elections 
- Improved voter 
registration procedures 
- Voter education 
- Participatory process 
(budgets, policies 
reporting, etc) 
- Capacity building 
- Media focus on poverty  
- Legislative/constitutional basis 
of social and economic rights  
- Political culture/ethos, political. 
will 
- Training/awareness (human 
rights of the poor, equality, etc.) 
- Affirmative action (recruiting 
people from diverse social 
backgrounds into civil service) 
- Civil society partnerships/ 
participation (budgeting, policy 
formulation, reporting, etc) 
- Human Rights Commission 
reporting on status regarding 
social and economic rights 
 
- Free and fair elections 
- Electorate awareness? 
- Vote of no confidence 
- Parliamentary oversight 
(budget) 
- Media and civil society/ donor 
scrutiny of pro-poor 
performance (gender budget) 
- Legal obligation to provide 
information  
- Legal obligation to provide 
reasons for decisions on 
request 
- HRC reports on socio-
economic rights 
- Social rights litigation 
Local 
government 
- Decentralisation from 
central to local levels? 
- Local government 
elections 
- Participatory planning 
process 
- Political culture 
- Training/awareness/capacity- 
building  
- Affirmative action  
- Participation/partnership 
- Accessibility 
- Free and fair elections 
- Tracing of public funds 
- Budget oversight 
- Obligation to give information  
- Obligation to give justification 
- Media, civil society awareness 
- Appeal procedures  
National 
legislatures 
- Free and fair elections 
- Information 
- Participatory process 
(hearings on legislation 
etc.)  
- Funding 
- Information 
- Training 
- Capacity building 
- Committee system 
- Elections 
- Recall 
- Referendum 
- Tied mandate 
Political 
parties 
- Freedom of 
organisation 
- Lasting party 
organisations  
- Representation at local 
level 
- Autonomous funding 
(not from executive) 
- Local nomination 
procedures 
- Issues of poverty reflected in 
party programmes and 
campaigns 
- Identifiable political platforms  
- Nomination processes and 
criteria (quotas for women, 
social groups such as 
unemployed) 
- Replacement 
- Tied mandates 
- Secure national/international 
party funding (autonomy from 
elite/business) 
- Media awareness 
- NGO awareness 
Judiciary - Legal literacy 
programmes  
- Legal aid schemes 
- Legal aid by NGOs 
- Training, exchanges of 
experience 
- Court procedure, 
criteria for standing 
- Change legal framework 
- Reform court system 
- Appointment of judges (social 
representativeness) 
- Sensitivity training (social 
rights, equality legislation) 
- Juries, lay assessors  
- Invitation of amicus’ briefs 
- Appeal procedures  
- Reporting of judgements 
- Plain language initiatives 
- Civil society debates  
 
Special 
institutions of 
restraint 
(ombudsmen, 
HRC, IEC, 
AG, etc.) 
- Outreach 
- Accessibility 
- Consultations 
- Composition 
- Training 
- Funding 
- Mandate 
- Media awareness 
- Withholding of funding 
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The ability of vertical and horizontal institutions to ensure accountability with respect 
to the concerns of the poor depends on a range of factors. Table 2 below suggests 
mechanisms for strengthening the voice of the poor, and for enhancing the 
responsiveness and accountability to the poor and poverty reduction by public agents 
at national and local levels.  
 
Enhancing vertical accountability through the electoral channel 
The government – in particular the executive branch, but also the legislature – is the 
most powerful public decision-maker at the national level. Thus it is crucial to make it 
more responsive and accountable to the concerns of poor. The question is, however, to 
what extent the traditional structures established for this purpose – with the electoral 
system at the core – are capable of delivering in terms of tangible results, especially 
between periodic elections.  
 
The literature on electoral processes is rather pessimistic with regard to representation 
of the poor and the underprivileged. Recent reports of electoral processes in the new 
democracies of sub-Saharan Africa indicate that elections have become ‘democratic 
façades’ that gloss over executive dominance and public exploitation by a small elite.4 
In Latin America and Eastern Europe, where electoral processes are more 
institutionalised, the elected representatives appear far more responsive to the 
demands of the small, powerful elites and vested interests than to the poor majority. 5  
 
For elections to function as an effective voice of the poor, they must have access to 
the formal democratic channels. We first need to ask the fundamental question 
whether the electoral process is actually open to the poor. Research from sub-Saharan 
Africa suggests that the voter registration processes effectively disenfranchise large 
numbers of poor citizens and bar them from participating due to long distances and 
financial constraints.6 The ‘democratic deficit problem’ does not end with formal 
access to the electoral channel. Across the developing world, the concerns of the poor 
feature only marginally in electoral campaigns. In order to make the formal 
democratic channels responsive to the poor and committed to poverty reduction, the 
role of political parties is critical. In the absence of relatively stable and identifiable 
party structures, the electoral channel cannot function properly as a vehicle for 
vertical accountability, capable of voicing the concerns of the poor. Poverty issues 
must be addressed in party programmes and election manifestos, as well as in the 
rhetoric and actual behaviour of party politicians, for these concerns to ‘capture’ the 
political agenda.  
                                                 
4 Diamond, Larry et al.,’Elections without democracy’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002. 
5 Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds.), Democracy in 
Developing Countries. Latin America, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. See also the paper prepared 
by Roberto Gargarella for this workshop: “Too far removed from the people”. Access to justice for the 
poor: the case of Latin America. 
6 Rakner, Lise and Lars Svåsand, “Multiparty Elections in Africa’s New Democracies”, Bergen: CMI 
Report R 2002:7, 2002. 
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· How can voter registration processes be improved and made more open for the 
majority of the voting population? 
· Can the party system be institutionalised to provide for more accountability to the  
commitment to reduce poverty? This seems to require the ‘survival’ of the main 
parties from one election to the next? 
· Do parties have identifiable political platforms that offer the voters policy 
alternatives in terms of poverty reduction? If not, how can this be achieved? 
 
To reach a level of institutionalisation, funding of political parties is an essential issue. 
The party systems in Latin America and Eastern Europe may point to a way forward 
for their sub-Saharan (and to some extent Asian) counterparts. Due to their relative 
endurance and ideological platforms, parties in these regions have to a degree been 
able to solicit funding from international party organisations (such as Western 
European ‘sister parties’, the European Community and the Socialist International and 
Christian Democratic party associations). Nevertheless, although more 
institutionalised the formal electoral channel in both Latin America and Eastern 
Europe is only to a limited extent accessible for the poor. Recent experiences with 
processes of participatory budgeting in Brazil do suggest, however, a way forward in 
terms of enhancing the accountability of the electoral channel regarding poverty 
reduction (see box p.10).  
 
Gender relations  
Promoting gender equality and empowering women is among the eight MDGs. As the 
gender dimension is a key element in overall human development it is important to 
address it in the context of poverty reduction. The incidence of poverty is generally 
greater among women than men and the depth of poverty also seems tilted against 
women. Lingering legal restrictions and cultural practices tend to discriminate against 
women to the effect that their access to property ownership is restricted. Similar 
discriminatory practices operate in the labour market and impede women’s 
employment prospects. 
 
There are also indications that women’s incomes make a greater beneficial 
contribution to intra-household cohesion, because women tend to prioritise the 
children in terms of food, clothing and education. A number of mechanisms have been 
elaborated for measuring progress towards gender equality, e.g. the gender-related 
human development index (GDI) and the gender empowerment measure (GEM). The 
former measures achievements in basic human development adjusted for gender 
inequality, while the latter measures gender inequality in economic and political 
opportunities. Similarly, tools have been developed for assessing budgets in terms of 
gender sensitivity. They involve analyses of public spending from a gender 
perspective with a view to ensuring consistency between commitment to gender 
equality and its reflection in actual allocation and practice. These instruments can be 
used to enhance the responsiveness of public actors to the plight of poor women, and 
to hold the same public authorities to account when failing to live up to their 
commitments. 
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A way forward? Participatory budgeting in Porto Allegre (Brazil) 
Participatory budgeting is a process by which the public meets in open assemblies to 
establish annual investment priorities for local governments. In the Brazilian state of 
Rio Grande do Sol, participatory budgeting was launched by the Workers Party in 
Porto Allegre in 1989. It was extended to the state level ten years later. The success of 
the programme in redirecting public investments to the poor has attracted 
international attention. The model has been exported to other states of Brazil, 
Argentina, France, Mexico, Angola, Senegal and South Africa. Politically, 
participatory budgeting has shifted the balance towards the left of the party system. 
Socially, participatory budgeting has giving voice to previously ignored segments of 
society and made the political system more responsive to their concerns.7 
 
Horizontal accountability at the national level 
In addition to the vertical accountability relationships through the electoral channel 
there are horizontal accountability relations – between the executive, the legislature, 
the courts, and special agencies of restraint – through which different state institutions 
hold each other to account on behalf of the people. Are these institutions able to 
secure the accountability of other government bodies? Are these institutions 
themselves responsive and accountable to the poor? We will consider these issues 
with respect to two of them: (a) the court system, which is the paradigmatic 
manifestation of horizontal accountability; and (b) human rights commissions, which 
in the past decade have been established in a number of new democracies.  
 
The courts and accountability to the poor 
In most countries the courts have not been important arenas for articulating the 
concerns of the poor. The court system is generally inaccessible, due to lack of 
knowledge, high cost, corruption and inadequate legal aid.8 Those who succeed in 
filing their cases often face delays for years, only to find that their concerns are 
eventually dismissed. Most legal traditions are unaccustomed to handling social 
rights. The recruitment of judges from the elite, leading a life far removed from the 
plight of the poor, also influences the operation of the legal system, which as a whole 
tends to protect vested interests. Public policies aimed at reducing poverty may 
actually be barred through court action, notwithstanding formal constitutional 
commitments to social and economic rights. 
 
There are examples of poor groups/NGOs successfully using court action to assert 
their rights, and of courts consciously promoting the interests of the weakest and most 
vulnerable. The Supreme Court of India has taken a lead in this regard, transforming 
itself into a “Supreme Court for Indians.” It has done so without strong backing for 
social and economic rights in the letter of the constitution. The Indian example has 
also inspired courts in other developing countries, not least in common law Africa, 
where a growing number of judges strives to be socially relevant and see their role as 
facilitating social transformation – radical change, but in an orderly fashion, based on 
principles.9 South Africa is an interesting case where the constitution has provided 
                                                 
7 B. Goldfranck and A. Schneider, “Budgets and ballots in Brazil: Participatory budgeting from the city 
to the state”, Brighton: IDS Working Paper No. 149, 2002. 
8 See Roberto Gargarella’s paper on Latin America prepared for this workshop (footnote 5 above). 
9 Gloppen’s personal communication with senior judges in Tanzania and South Africa. See also 
Jennifer. A. Widner, Building the Rule of Law, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
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both a constitutional basis for social rights cases and has created a new Constitutional 
Court with a mandate to protect them. 
 
A way forward? Social rights litigation 
The Grootboom case considered the right to housing and the right of children to 
adequate shelter. The case was brought by a group of families with children who had 
been evicted from a squatter settlement.  
The South African Constitutional Court did not grant individual legal redress from 
the state based on the plaintiffs’ social or economic rights. But it ruled that the 
constitutional obligation of the state to “take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation” of 
the right to housing, had not been sufficiently discharged by the housing authorities. 
In addition to medium- and long-term housing programmes, reasonable schemes for 
the immediate and short term were needed to provide destitute people with 
rudimentary shelter. While the Court found that the constitutional right to housing 
does not constitute a directly enforceable claim on the part of homeless people, its 
ruling established the right to housing as a justiciable right, placing firm legal 
obligations on state policy and its implementation. In this case an NGO provided 
high quality legal assistance to the litigants while another NGO, acting as a ‘friend 
of the court’, provided a brief that much of the judgement rested on.10 
 
Lessons from countries with experience of social interest litigation on behalf of poor 
groups (India, South Africa), as distinct from countries in which the legal system is 
more hostile to the poor, suggest certain key factors. Information and legal literacy on 
the part of the poor and their NGO representatives seem crucial, in particular 
knowledge of relevant case material and legal reasoning. Lower costs, adequate legal 
aid schemes, less bureaucratic and less costly court procedures, and more lenient 
criteria of legal standing are all factors that would be helpful. Similarly, capable 
courts, adequately equipped, efficient and free from corruption, would greatly 
enhance the prospects for social rights litigation. 
 
Finally, a very important factor is political will on the part of the government to 
comply with and implement the rulings of the courts. This is, in turn, closely linked to 
the legitimacy of the courts generally, and with respect to social rights cases in 
particular. The problem of creating legitimacy for accountability mechanisms among 
those agents they are designed to restrain is even more pronounced for the weaker 
accountability mechanisms discussed here. This problem, sometimes framed as ‘how 
to create a culture of constitutionalism’ and secure a commitment to self-binding, lies 
at the heart of the question of how to strengthen the accountability of decision-
makers.11 
                                                 
10 “Grootboom and others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and others”, SACCT 38/2000. 
Section 26 of the South African constitution provides that (1) everyone has a right to adequate housing; 
(2) the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right; (3) no one may be evicted from their homes, or have 
their homes demolished, without a court order made after considering all the relevant circumstances; 
and (4) no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
11 The term self-binding refers to a particular understanding of how constitutional commitment works. 
It is well set out by Jon Elster who refers to the myth of Ulysses and the Sirens. Ulysses, who, knowing 
he will be entranced by the Sirens’ song and prone to steer his ship into disaster, binds himself to the 
mast and orders his crew to keep a steady direction and plug their ears. In this way he may enjoy the 
wonderful song but still steer clear of the Sirens’ dangerous temptation. Similarly, a constitution, as an 
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Special accountability institutions  
The special institutions, established by many modern constitutional democracies to 
increase the accountability of other government institutions, include national human 
rights institutions (HRIs). Their names, mandates, powers and functions vary 
considerably, but generally their central tasks comprise regular reporting on the 
performance of government from a human rights perspective. Their reports are often 
presented to parliament and in most cases made public. 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) is among the more powerful 
and resourceful.12 For our purposes it is of particular interest that part of its mandate is 
to report on the performance of the government with regard to social and economic 
rights. The South African HRC does not confine itself to watching government 
institutions. It conducted, for example, a controversial inquiry into racism in the 
media and has also investigated racism in the school system.  
 
It is necessary to consider factors within the institutions themselves (an appropriate 
mandate from a poverty reduction perspective, the availability of resources, the 
appointment, training, composition and tenure of commissioners), as well as 
opportunity for the poor and their organisations to access the HRI with their concerns 
(outreach, knowledge, training). In many cases HRIs are weak institutions, either 
because they lack resources or competence, or because their independence is not 
safeguarded, with the result that they become apologists for the government rather 
than watchdogs. The fact that some of these institutions are new means that their 
appropriate roles are somewhat indeterminate in the eyes of the commissioners, the 
public and the politicians alike. In other cases, HRIs operate appropriately and 
produce solid, critical reports, only to find that parliament and other bodies mandated 
to take action fail to do so. 
 
· Are courts suitable channels for articulating the interests of the poor and 
appropriate vehicles for bringing decision-makers to account for their poverty 
reduction activities? How can action be taken to avoid the courts effectively 
blocking pro-poor change?  
· How can these legal institutions be reformed to become more responsive to the 
concerns of the poor? 
· If the courts themselves are made more responsive and accountable to the 
poor, could such a development compromise their independence and 
jeopardise their ability to hold other decision-makers to account?  
· Few institutions of horizontal accountability hold decision-makers accountable 
in practice but which of them hold greater promise in that regard? 
                                                                                                                                            
overriding, long-term commitment made after thorough reflection, should serve as a mechanism of 
restraint on actions and decisions (legislation and policies), in order not to allow short-term temptations 
to jeopardise crucial long-term goals. The relevant question here is: what mechanisms can ensure that 
the ‘constitutional’ commitment by the donors to reducing poverty is not overridden by the temptations 
represented by domestic businesses, agricultural interests and other sirens? See Jon Elster, Ulysses and 
the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
12 Information about the HRC is available on the Commission’s website: http://www.sahrc.org.za/ 
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3.2 Responsiveness and accountability of public agents at the international 
level  
As argued above, in recent decades the influence of internationa l public actors and 
institutions has increased dramatically in poor, indebted nations. Today the IMF and 
the World Bank lend exclusively to developing and emerging economies. The loans 
and policy prescriptions of multilateral and bilateral donors are linked to conditions 
that increasingly impinge on the domestic policies of the state. It is essential, 
therefore, to acknowledge that in poor countries external actors are active 
stakeholders in the domestic policy arena, through agenda-setting and orchestrating 
alliances between interested players.13  
 
Two central questions must be addressed with regard to international public actors 
and how they can amplify the voice of poor and increase their responsiveness and 
accountability to poverty reduction: 
  
· To what extent can the accountability mechanisms at the national/local level 
described above be enhanced by external support? Political or governance 
conditionality has been on the agenda of the international donor community for 
more than a decade. However, we need to assess carefully how and under what 
circumstances the international community may enhance internal accountability 
relations.  
· To what extent can the international donor community be held accountable to their 
commitment to poverty reduction? Table 3 below attempts to map the relationship 
between the international actors and their responsiveness to the poor and their 
accountability to the commitment to reduce poverty. 
 
                                                 
13 Callaghy, Thomas M., ‘Networks and governance in Africa: innovation in the debt regime’, in T.M. 
Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds.), Intervention and Transn ationalism in Africa: Global-
Local Networks of Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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Table 3 Responsiveness and accountability of public agents at international level 
 
Institutional  
Focus 
Means of strengthening the 
VOICE  
of the poor  
Mechanisms for strengthening  
RESPONSIVENESS  
of decision-makers to the poor 
Mechanisms for strengthening  
ACCOUNTABILITY 
of decision-makers to the poor 
Bilateral donors - Participatory processes 
(policy formulation, 
project development., 
implementation and 
assessment) 
- Information 
- Capacity-building for 
interest articulation 
 
- Mandate (from national 
parliaments in donor 
country) 
- Donor co-ordination? 
- NGOs/CSOs in donor co-
ordination meetings 
- Staff composition (social 
background, training, 
professional culture) 
- Incentive structure  
- Policy coherence 
 
- Sanctions (by parliaments in 
donor country) 
- Public evaluations of pro-
poor performance 
- Pressure from 
executive/parliaments in 
recipient country 
- National, international 
media, NGOs, reporting on 
pro-poor performance 
- Institutional mechanism to 
enforce commitment to 
long-term strategy of 
poverty reduction 
International 
financial 
institutions 
- Participatory processes  
- Information 
- Capacity-building for 
interest articulation 
 
- Mandate 
- Donor co-ordination? 
- Staff culture, incentive 
structure, training 
- Policy coherence 
 
- Increased vote of poor 
countries 
- Answerability for decisions 
made/not made, 
(institutional mechanism to 
enforce commitment to 
long-term strategy of 
poverty reduction?) 
- NGOs /public bodies 
regularly reporting on pro-
poor performance 
- Media scrutiny 
Multilateral 
organisations with 
a mandate for 
poverty reduction 
(UN) 
- Increased vote for poor 
countries  
- Participatory processes  
- Information 
- Capacity-building for 
interest articulation 
 
- Mandate 
- Representation and voting 
rules 
- Staff (composition, 
training, incentive 
structure) 
- NGOs /public bodies 
regularly reporting on pro-
poor performance  
- Media scrutiny 
- Institutional mechanism to 
enforce commitment to 
long-term strategy of 
poverty reduction? 
Multilateral 
organisations with 
significant impact 
on poverty, but no 
explicit mandate 
(WTO, OECD) 
- Increased vote for poor 
countries  
- Information 
- Capacity-building for 
interest articulation 
-  
- Mandate 
- Representation and voting 
rules 
- Staff (composition, 
training) 
- NGOs /public bodies 
regularly reporting on pro-
poor performance  
- Media scrutiny 
- Institutional mechanism to 
enforce commitment to 
long-term strategy of 
poverty reduction? 
Regional 
organisations 
(AU, EU) 
- Increased vote for poor 
countries  
- Participatory processes  
- Information 
- Capacity-building for 
interest articulation 
  
- Mandate 
- Representation and voting 
rules 
- Staff (composition, 
training) 
 
- NGOs/public bodies 
regularly reporting on pro-
poor performance  
- Media scrutiny 
- Institutional mechanism to 
enforce commitment to 
long-term strategy of 
poverty reduction? 
 
 
 
 
  15 
External demands for voice, responsiveness and accountability 
Since the UN General Assembly in 2000 the Millennium Development Goals have 
become the benchmark by which the entire international community will judge its 
degree of success one and a half decades down the line. The eight MDGs are: 
 
· Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
· Achieve universal primary education; 
· Promote gender equality and empower women; 
· Reduce child mortality; 
· Improve maternal health; 
· Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
· Ensure environmental sustainability; 
· Develop a global partnership for development. 
 
These goals are broad in scope yet inter-related and their achievement will in one way 
or another contribute to the overarching goal of poverty reduction because they 
address various aspects of the poverty syndrome.14 Although the goals are formulated 
in general terms they are specified by eighteen targets so as to monitor progress along 
the way and measure their ultimate achievement. However, the operationalisation of 
the goals and targets into means and strategies to meet them is less straightforward 
and rather contentious, particularly at the country level. The international community 
has not yet agreed on the road map to 2015. The current endeavours by heavily 
indebted countries to chart such strategies – Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) – represent one attempt towards drawing such a road map. The UN sees the 
PRSPs as useful instruments for integrating the MDGs fully within the set of 
priorities, policies and resource allocations.15 
 
 
· Can the voice of the poor, responsiveness to their concerns and accountability 
to poverty reduction by national governments be enhanced by international 
pressure and assistance? 
· Are there circumstances in which external pressure and intervention may 
‘crowd out’ internal mechanisms of democratic accountability?  
· What mechanisms are needed to ensure that national governments owe greater 
obligation to their national constituencies than to international external 
agreements? 
 
PRSPs as mechanisms of accountability 
The approach adopted by the World Bank and IMF to designing poverty-reduction 
strategies in the context of debt relief programmes is perhaps the most tangible 
attempt by the international donor community to induce national governments to 
honour their commitment to poverty reduction. All countries requesting debt relief 
under the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative must chart a poverty 
reduction strategy through a broad participatory process and produce a policy 
document – a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This process aims to 
                                                 
14 This paper puts the accent on poverty aspects and considers the other MDGs to be subsidiary to and 
supportive of the overriding goal of poverty reduction, even though the MDGs are explicitly considered 
equally important. 
15 See The United Nations and the MDGs: A Core Strategy, 7 June 2002. 
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incorporate a range of stakeholder views on prioritisation, resource allocation and 
access to public goods and services. Tied to a set of governance conditionalities, the 
PRSPs have placed poverty reduction at the top of the official agenda in debtor 
countries.  
 
· Who has been empowered by the PRSP processes?  
· Do the PRSPs contribute to reinforcing existing accountability mechanisms at the 
national and local level? 
· Have the PRSPs strengthened the voice of the poor?  
 
Preliminary findings from sub-Saharan Africa paint a varied picture as to whether 
these processes enhance existing accountability mechanisms at the national and local 
level. In some instances, the PRSPs have been successful in promoting greater 
stakeholder participation and thereby making both vertical and horizontal 
accountability channels more accessible for the poor. Research on the PRSP process 
in Tanzania suggests that its participatory nature has strengthened the position of 
transnational NGOs such as Oxfam, Care and Save the Children, to the detriment of 
players in the national political arena – parliament in particular.16 Whether 
participation – induced by externally imposed conditionalities – will lead to increased 
responsiveness on the part of national political institutions depends on the extent to 
which the PRSP process is ‘owned’ by the national governments. The cases of 
Uganda and Vietnam may be instructive and point to ways forward. 
 
A way forward? Ownership of PRSPs in Vietnam and Uganda 
Studies of the Ugandan and Vietnamese PRSP processes indicate that they have been 
successful in promoting greater stakeholder participation and making vertical and 
horizontal accountability channels more accessible for the poor. In Uganda, a 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was implemented in 1995, thus predating 
the World Bank/IMF PRSP initiative of 1999. Since the PEAP was formulated in 
consultation with Ugandan NGOs, the subsequent PRSP could build on the PEAP 
experiences. Vietnam’s own policy process to eradicate poverty was well underway 
when the multilateral financial institutions initiated discussions on the PRSP. 
Government ownership is strong at the policy level and the donor agenda for poverty 
reduction is built into the already existing national development planning system. 
Vietnam has also taken significant steps in recent years to make the planning process 
more inclusive.  
 
Who holds public international actors to account? 
Elected leaders and administrators at the international level have a mandate they are 
authorised to carry out on behalf of us all (including the poor). In principle, they owe 
accountability and responsiveness similar to those of national governments. In 
practice, however, the institutional mechanisms for holding them to account are 
poorly developed. Developing countries are deeply affected by the decisions of 
institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. Yet, they have little 
influence on the decision-making of these multilateral institutions. Nearly half the 
voting power in the World Bank and the IMF is in the hands of the seven largest 
industrial countries and the Bretton Woods institutions are perceived to be overly 
                                                 
16 Jeremy Gould, ‘Discipline and Empower: Political Consequences of Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy’, Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, mimeo, 2002. 
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accountable to their largest shareholders. Any attempt to deepen democracy in the 
international finance institutions confronts the reality of these power relationships. 
The UN agencies with equal voting rights for developed and developing nations alike 
are also the least powerful of the multilateral institutions, partly owing to the large 
industrial nations’ disregard or neglect. While only providing a partial answer, 
changes in vote distribution and enhanced accessibility by non-governmental 
organisations are essential to increase the responsiveness and accountability of the 
multilateral institutions.  
 
Whereas governments are held accountable through a series of social, political and 
legal institutions, there are very few – if any – comparable mechanisms currently in 
place to hold global actors to account. To what extent and by what mechanisms can 
the international donor community be held accountable for the policy advice they give 
and the conditionalities they impose? Attention should not only be paid to the do’s but 
also to the don’ts. A negative obligation (whether moral or legal) to refrain from 
action that is clearly detrimental to reducing poverty has the clear advantage of 
applying equally to all agents. 
 
· Donor governments – like national governments – are confronted with multi-
faceted accountability relationships. How can their self-binding to poverty 
reduction as an overriding and long-term goal be secured? 
· How can the voice of developing countries be enhanced within public 
international institutions? 
 
 
A way forward? Judicial -style accountability in international organisations 
Tribunals and ombudspersons permit citizens at the national level to hold 
governments to account. International counterparts are now emerging to ensure that 
international organisations act within their powers and keep to their operational 
rules. The World Bank’s Inspections Panel, created in 1993, is a notable step in the 
right direction. In 1999 an Ombudsman Office was added. The Inspection Panel 
makes preliminary assessments of the complaints lodged, taking into account Bank 
management responses to the allegations. The panel can then recommend to the 
Bank’s Executive Board that a full investigation be instituted. 
3.3 Responsiveness and accountability of civil society and market agents 
In a globalising world the state is no longer the only actor accountable for poverty 
reduction. Over the past two decades transnational civil society networks have 
increased tremendously. Similarly, the role and influence of global corporations have 
been greatly enhanced. Campaigns to reduce the debt of poor countries and to make 
global trade less skewed in favour of the interests of the industrialised world have in 
recent years greatly affected decisions within the international organisations as well as 
within global business corporations. Similarly, local and transnational NGO networks 
have put pressure on national governments to deepen democracy. But, to whom are 
the NGOs and the businesses accountable – at local, national and internationa l levels? 
To what extent do they represent the interest of the poor? How can they be made more 
responsive and accountable to a long-term strategy of poverty reduction? How can the 
‘invisible hand of the market’ be brought to account for its faults of commission or 
omission with respect to the poverty-reduction targets? 
  18 
Table 4 Voice, responsiveness and accountability of civil society and market 
agents 
 
Institutional  
Focus 
Means of strengthening the 
VOICE  
of the poor  
Mechanisms for strengthening 
RESPONSIVENESS  
of decision-makers to the poor 
Mechanisms for strengthening 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
of decision-makers to the poor 
Transnational 
business 
corporations 
- International media focus 
- Information/ 
transparency  
- NGOs 
- Litigation 
- Lobbying 
- Corporate culture  
- Codes of conduct 
- Training, raise awareness, 
knowledge (business ethics, 
poverty issues) 
- Business-NGO partnerships 
- Negative publicity 
- Official/consumer sanctions 
- National/international courts to 
rule on human rights violations 
against poor 
- Business-NGO partnerships 
National/local 
business 
- Media focus on poverty 
and the poor 
- Information/training 
- Participation in 
“tripartite” bodies 
(government, labour, 
business (+ civil society)) 
- Corporate culture  
- Codes of conduct 
- Raise awareness, knowledge 
(business ethics, poverty issues) 
- Business-NGO partnerships 
- “Twinning” arrangements with 
corporations  in other countries  
- Horizontal application of rights 
(non-discrimination, affirmative 
action, social rights) 
- Labour legislation 
- Court cases  
- Local media 
- Local NGOs 
- “Tripartite” bodies  
International NGOs - Information/ transparency 
- Capacity development of 
local NGOs and informal 
CSOs  
- Knowledge of local 
context  
- Constituency  
- Fund projects to empower 
the poor 
- Knowledge 
- Engagement in public policy 
- Public education programmes in 
poor countries 
- Advocacy for policy 
changes/development 
- Funding (adequacy, security) 
 
- Clearly articulated mission, 
aims and objectives 
- Transparent and robust 
accounting systems 
- Systematic, regular feedback to 
constituency 
- Member-based sanctions 
- Donor reporting/sanctions 
- Media 
- Court cases 
National/local 
NGOs 
- Information/ transparency 
- Presence at the local level 
- Constituency within poor 
groups 
- Grassroots focus/work in 
partnership with the poor 
on local level projects 
- Organisational culture 
- Composition of staff  
- Training, awareness and 
knowledge on poverty issues 
- Advocacy for policy changes 
with INGOs and NGOs 
 
 
- Clearly defines objectives 
- Independent and legally 
registered board of trustees 
- Regulatory framework 
- Direct representation/ elections 
- Systematic and regular 
feedback to constituency 
- Transparent accounting systems 
- Media focus 
- Member sanctions 
- Sanctioning donors 
(international and national) 
- Court cases 
International media - How to ‘market’ poverty 
issues? 
- Training, information 
- Capacity 
- Local branches  
 
- Financial conditions/ ownership 
structure 
- Mandate 
- Codes of conduct 
- Composition of staff (social 
background, training, 
professional norms) 
- Local presence in poor areas  
- Financial conditions/ ownership 
structure 
- Regulations 
- Codes of conduct 
- NGOs/public bodies reporting 
on performance from 
perspective of poor groups 
(exposure) 
National/local 
media 
- Establishment/ funding to 
local, community based 
radio stations 
- Training, information 
- Capacity 
- Local news desks 
 
 
 
- Financial conditions 
(ownership, resources) 
- Mandate 
- Public media boards 
- Code of conduct 
- Background of staff 
- Training, information 
- Capacity building 
- Local presence  
- Media laws 
- International donors (funding) 
- Codes of conduct 
- NGOs/public bodies (such as 
Human Rights Commission) 
reporting on performance from 
perspective of poor groups 
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The responsiveness and accountability of civil society and market agents are relevant, 
not only at the international level but also nationally and locally. With regard to these 
non-state agents, there is disagreement on the extent to which they owe accountability 
to society generally and the poor specifically, and on what grounds. These actors do 
not have an explicit mandate ‘to serve the public interest’. It is clear, however, that 
particularly in weak states where the majority of poor people live, many non-
governmental agents (such as transnational corporations) vastly influence the policies 
pursued. Hence, their behaviour often bears decisively on the overall responsiveness 
and accountability of the political system with respect to poverty reduction.  
 
Several forms of duty to the poor can be distinguished that may give rise to 
accountability obligations by non-state agents: 
 
· First, the negative duty to refrain from action that violates human rights. This 
uncontroversial accountability obligation has a basis in international law and cases 
can be brought before domestic legal systems. 
· Second, the negative duty to refrain from obstructing other agents in their efforts 
to reduce poverty – by demanding more leniency, for example, in labour policies 
or tax regimes in exchange for investment or aid, that might affect the poor 
adversely.  
· Third, a positive duty to act, within their ability, to reduce poverty, based on the 
moral norms embodied in international human rights instruments. This moral 
obligation applies to everybody but it might be difficult to elevate it to a legal 
duty. 
 
Below we discuss the complex role of transnational corporations, civil society and the 
mass media. Table 4 suggests means of amplifying the voice of the poor, and 
mechanisms for enhancing the responsiveness and accountability to poverty reduction 
by civil society and market forces. 
 
The role of the international business community 
The growth of transnational corporations (TNCs) as major actors is both a cause and a 
consequence of globalisation, and their operations span the globe. At present the 
TNCs do not have legal standing in international law. They are subject to national 
legislation in their countries of domicile and to the laws of those countries in which 
their subsidiaries operate. Nevertheless, it is increasingly recognised that some form 
of global regulatory regime is needed. A trend towards a so-called ‘new sovereignty’ 
is discernible, whereby states become members of inter-governmental organisations 
and accede to mounting quantities of legally binding treaties covering increasingly 
broad areas.17 This trend is largely driven within the framework of UN organisations. 
In the field of human rights the various conventions constitute such a regime at the 
normative level. In the environment field conventions on climate change and 
biological diversity are more recent examples. Yet, the enforcement and 
accountability mechanisms are still weak, despite their embryo in the UN system. It is 
conceivable, however, that the normative frameworks already in place as an 
expression of multilateralism – and new ones to be elaborated – could design 
                                                 
17 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
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accountability mechanisms applicable to an array of actors including the business 
community in general and the TNCs in particular.18 
 
· A number of non-state actors (TNCs and NGOs) have also committed themselves 
to poverty reduction. How can their long-term self-binding be secured? 
· How can the ‘discretionary’ social responsibility of business corporations be 
expanded and firmed up into serious commitments? 
 
Pending the establishment of a fully-fledged, global ‘human development regime’ the 
international business community has embarked on a method that holds promise. 
Enterprises are, of course, in the profit-making business. But they can justifiably 
argue that in creating jobs and generating economic growth – which is a prerequisite 
for poverty reduction – they are making a significant pro-poor contribution. 
Conversely, when closing down plants or when not adhering to established norms of 
corporate behaviour they play a negative role. Hence, companies are increasingly 
realising that making a conscious contribution to poverty reduction can be ‘good for 
business’ in the long run and sometimes also in the short run. In recent years, TNCs 
have come under pressure by NGOs and other actors to account for their dealings with 
autocratic and abusive governments, and for the ill treatment of employees by their 
sub-contractors in developing countries. Firms previously brushed off such criticism, 
claiming they had no control over Third World suppliers. This is no longer acceptable.  
 
Some companies have acted on their own to meet the challenges. Shell, for example, 
chastened by the hammering it received for its extensive operations in Nigeria when 
the military government in 1995 hanged Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, embarked 
on a round of consultations with human rights groups, church leaders, and its own 
employees. In 1997 Shell issued a Statement of General Business Principles, 
including human rights and corporate responsibility to the society in which its 
companies operate.19 A management primer on the subject requires the chief 
executives of its some 130 subsidiaries around the world to report annually what has 
been done to meet human rights standards, environmental and other social goals.  
 
Similar, self- imposed codes of conduct are today commonplace in the business 
community but generally of a minimalist nature. Most businesses are careful to point 
out that wider conceptions of corporate social responsibility are ‘discretionary’. 
Besides, it is acknowledged that it might be difficult to determine how far such a 
social responsibility ought to extend. There is no obvious answer to that question; it is 
left to the discretion of the company concerned, based on a careful assessment of the 
situation at hand.  
 
New notions of corporate social responsibility are emerging worldwide. Wary of 
being caught off-guard TNCs have sough together in such organisations as Business 
for Social Responsibility, a San Francisco-based association founded in 1992, which 
boasts 1,400 members with a combined annual turnover of USD 1.5 trillion. The 
association keeps its member companies abreast of a range of social issues, including 
                                                 
18 John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an International Form, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
19 Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, Statement of General Business Principles, Shell 
International Limited, 1997. 
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human rights.20 There is no doubt that this awakening to the challenge of human rights 
and poverty reduction is part of a growing general, internationalised human rights 
culture, spurred by consumer displeasure, public criticism and articulate segments of 
civil society (national and transnational NGOs alike, the trade union movement, etc). 
The adverse effect on profit margins of operating in hostile environments has been an 
additional internal driving force. International business organisations working on a 
global scale have been preoccupied with articulating common standards to be adhered 
to in an increasingly competitive marketplace. The World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, originally formed to influence the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, has set up a working group to address corporate 
social responsibility that may point to a way forward. 
 
A way forward? Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000) 
The Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) and its affiliate the Council on Economic 
Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA) have taken a step further in one specific 
sub-field of human rights. Based on the ILO conventions and related international 
human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, CEPAA has elaborated an auditable, 
common standard for companies seeking to guarantee the basic rights of their 
workers: Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000). It covers child labour, forced labour, 
health and safety, collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary action, working 
hours, compensation and leadership.  
The intention is to elevate SA 8000 to a certification standard comparable to those 
elaborated by the International Standards Organisation, upon which it is modelled. It 
is hoped that companies would seek SA 8000 certification, much in the way 
manufacturers seek certification of their performance to international quality 
standards (ISO 9000) and environmental management systems (ISO 14000). It is 
noteworthy that the initiative to introduce this standard was taken by the business 
community itself; it was a voluntary move rather than a requirement imposed by state 
authorities, perhaps reflecting an enlightened self-interest. However, massive NGO 
campaigns were mounted to push in the same direction, and NGO pressure will 
probably be needed to monitor developments and act a watchdog. NGOs are 
concerned that self-imposed regulation might be misused as public relations stunts. 
 
The role of civil society 
Non-governmental organisations at local, national and international levels have 
diverse roles to play with regard to poverty reduction. Some community-based 
organisations at the grassroots are directly involved in development work and service 
delivery for the benefit of poor people. Others have assumed an advocacy role vis-á-
vis public authorities at the local and national levels in order to exert influence in a 
pro-poor direction. Some transnational NGOs work globally towards the same goal. 
Other still, have positioned themselves as watchdogs, gathering information and 
publicising findings with a view to bringing various actors to account for not being 
responsive enough to the needs of the poor or for doing too little for poverty 
reduction. These functions of pro-poor development, service delivery, advocacy and 
watchdog monitoring of the performance of institutions with an explicit pro-poor 
mandate are critical to the issues under discussion. 
 
                                                 
20 ‘The World is Watching: A Survey of Human Rights Law’, Economist, 5 December 1998. 
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Having said that, it must be recalled that civil society organisations themselves need 
to be held accountable for their actions. In the case of membership-based NGOs the 
accountability relationship is straightforward: elected officers are controlled by the 
members at annual general meetings. However, many NGOs – perhaps the majority – 
are not membership-based. To whom, then, are their office-bearers accountable? To 
what extent are NGOs self-styled ventures controlled by leaders who have just taken 
upon themselves the mantle of responsibility on behalf of the poor without prior 
consultation? 
 
A way forward? The South African Women’s Budget Initiative 
The South African Women's Budget Initiative (WBI) was established in 1995, soon 
after the first democratic elections in the country, as a collaborative project of 
national parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations. It researches the link 
between budgets, gender and poverty, and conducts training, advocacy and capacity-
building. In its first three years the WBI examined the budgets of all the national 
departments and affiliated agencies. An evaluation led to a stronger focus on thematic 
studies and the WBI no longer produces annual updates on all departments. 
Reporting to parliament and civil society on spending and the effects on different 
groups in society is considered the responsibility of government departments as part 
of their accountability duty. The WBI has lately taken a more experimental and 
provocative course, exploring the evolving field of gender budget analysis in relation 
to new issues. Recent efforts have addressed themes such as municipal budgets, donor 
funding, job creation, revenue generation, taxation, health and the relationship 
between policy-making and budgeting across all tiers of government. 
The WIB is part of a broader Budget Information Service (BIS) initiated by Idasa to 
make budgets responsive to the poor by building capacity for effective participation; 
providing decision-makers with research, analyses, information and 
recommendations about the impact of budgets on the poor; and researching the 
budget system and advocating changes in a pro-poor and pro-participation direction. 
Since 1999 this venture has included the Children’s Budget project, reporting on 
child poverty and the budget and conducting workshops for government, NGOs and 
parliamentarians.  BIS co-operates with and supports applied budget organisations in 
other countries through the International Budget Project and the Africa Budget 
Project, e.g. in Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Malawi on budget training 
courses, on a multi-country scorecard on Transparency and Participation in the 
Budget Process, and on training of journalists and parliamentarians.21 
 
The role of the mass media 
In order to alter existing power relations and give voice to the poor the mass media 
play a key role. They may, in effect, act as a mouthpiece for the poor. On the other 
hand, the media are also actors in their own right, to be held accountable for their 
action and inaction. Unlike public institutions the media do not have an explicit 
mandate ‘to serve the public interest’ and it is debatable, therefore, whether they can 
be held accountable for a commitment to poverty reduction. 
 
                                                 
21 The Women’s Budget Initiative is a joint project of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
(IDASA), the Community Agency for Social Enquiry and the parliamentary Committee on the Quality 
of Life and Status of Women. More information about the Women’s Budget Initiative, and the Budget 
Information Programme is available at IDASA’s website http://www.idasa.org.za/  
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· Do the media form citizens’ perceptions of the poor? 
· What are the main impediments to the development of free media responsive to 
the concerns of the poor?  
· To what extent can new technology facilitate the development of a pluralistic 
press that provides a voice for the poor?  
 
Giving voice to the poor is a means to their empowerment. One of the most positive 
developments in terms of democratic reform in new democracies is the development 
of pluralistic and independent media.22 Independent newspapers have emerged and 
despite setbacks the independent press continues to be the main critical voice against 
government corruption and other malpractices. It is less certain, however, whether 
these developments have benefited the poor. There are constraints. First of all, the 
independent newspapers only reach a fraction of the literate, urban-based population 
and the electronic media often remain under government control. Thus, the poor have 
benefited only marginally from the emerging pluralism of the media. Radio, TV and 
government-owned newspapers often remain the mouthpieces of the executive and the 
incumbent party. Even in situations where the private media have a broader reach, its 
dependence on private financ ing often affects editorial policy in favour of the owners. 
There is a clear tendency, however, for the media to cover matters related to the local 
elites.  
 
Independent media boards and broadcasting authorities are institutional mechanisms 
designed to increase the accountability of the media, albeit without jeopardising their 
independence. To what extent such bodies can contribute to making national and local 
media more sensitive to the concerns of the poor and committed to a focus on poverty 
reduction depends on their mandates and powers, as well as the way in which they 
have constituted themselves.  
 
In some countries the media themselves have established self-regulatory bodies on a 
voluntary basis. Rules of sound and fair journalism are established for the industry 
against which media performance may be judged. Readers, listeners and viewers may 
lodge complaints if they consider their privacy or personal integrity violated, if they 
feel unfairly treated or harassed, or if reporting is unduly biased. A body of media 
professionals would then consider the complaints and adjudicate on the matter. If 
found guilty of having transgressed the rules, a retraction or correction might then be 
ordered or whatever the case might be. 
                                                 
22 Randall, Vicky (ed.), ‘Democratisation and the Media’, Democratisation  (Special Issue), Vol 5, No. 
2, 1998. 
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A way forward? Independent Media Authorities 
The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established 
in 2000 in response to a constitutional requirement for a body “to regulate 
broadcasting in the public interest, and to ensure fairness and a diversity of views 
broadly representing South African society.”23 Empowerment and promotion of 
public, private and community broadcasting services which are responsive to the 
needs of the public is part of ICASA’s mandate. It aims to ensure that all citizens have 
access to relevant and appropriate broadcasting services, and to encourage 
ownership and control of the electronic media by people from historically 
disadvantaged groups in order to promote a competitive and socially responsive 
communications industry.  
Acknowledging the impossibility for ISACA alone to ensure diversity and the 
development of media for all South Africans, a new statutory body is about to be 
established for this purpose: the Media Development and Diversity Agency. Its 
central aim is to provide projects to community and small commercial media in order 
to redress the exclusion and marginalisation of disadvantaged communities from 
access to the media and media industry. 
 
Pluralism is a key objective, not only in terms of the range of views and interests 
represented but also in terms of the modes of communicating them. In poor countries, 
with high levels of illiteracy, national newspapers may not be successful in providing 
a voice for the poor. Instead, local, community-based radio stations have proven 
extremely useful. Two examples from recent elections in sub-Saharan Africa point to 
the complexities facing the media and the opportunities on offer. A recent evaluation 
revealed the inadequacies and fundamental weaknesses of the Zambian media in their 
coverage of the 2001 Zambian elections.24 The national media did not report on issues 
relevant to poor voters and completely ignored the local government candidates. One 
notable exception was community-based radio stations, which gave free airtime to 
members of parliament and local government councillors with support from local 
NGOs. The case of Zambia is not exceptional. In most African states the most common 
means of communication is radio. The majority of households have access to radio, 
while only a minority, predominantly based in urban areas, have access to television or 
the press. Successful elections – those perceived to be free and fair and inclusive of a 
plurality of views, such as Ghana’s 2000 elections – include an unbiased coverage of 
parties and candidates.25 
 
 
                                                 
23 See the ISACA web site http://www.icasa.org.za/ and that of its predecessor, the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA): http://www.iba.org.za/, established in terms of the South African 
constitution, section 192. ISACA’s predecessor, the IBA, was established in 1993 as part of the 
transition to democracy. The main purpose was to provide a more level playing field for the different 
parties and the IBA was given the power to licence broadcasters, formulate broadcasting policy, 
receive, hear and adjudicate complaints, and regulate the broadcasting industry as a whole – a task 
previously performed mainly by the Minister of Home Affairs. The functions of the IBA were taken 
over by the ISACA.  
24 Mwalongo, S., ‘The role of media in ensuring accountability in the 2001 Zambian elections’, 
INESOR Working Paper Series, Lusaka: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of 
Zambia, 2002. 
25 Gyimah-Boadi, E., ‘A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2001. 
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A way forward? Accountability by tracing school grants in Uganda 
According to official statistics, Uganda spent roughly eight per cent of GNP on 
primary school education in the mid-1990s. Anecdotal evidence suggested, however, 
that most public schools received only limited public support. A tracing survey, 
focusing on a pre-student capitation grant to cover the schools’ non-wage 
expenditures, compared flows allegedly disbursed from the central government with 
those actually received by 250 primary schools over a five-year period (1991–1995). 
The survey showed that on average schools received only 13 per cent of what the 
central government spent on the programme. Most schools did not receive anything at 
all. The bulk of the money was captured by local officials and politicians. The survey 
findings impacted directly on policy by providing a spark for public action. As the 
evidence became public knowledge, the central government made a number of 
changes. Most importantly, it began publishing the monthly trans fers of public funds 
in the district newspapers, broadcasting the transfers on radio and requiring primary 
schools to feed back information on the inflow of funds. An assessment of the reforms 
a few years later showed that the flow of funds had improved dramatically.26 
 
* * * * * 
 
This paper has provided an analytical framework for deliberating on the 
responsiveness of various agents and agencies to the concerns and needs of the poor. 
It has also suggested various schemata for addressing systematically the multitude of 
mechanisms whereby agents and agencies mandated to reduce poverty can be held to 
account for their action or non-action.  
 
                                                 
26 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson, ‘Local Capture and the Political Economy of School Financing’, 
Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, mimeo, 2002. 
  
 
Summary 
Taking its cue from the poverty-reduction thrust of the 
Millennium Development Goals, this paper proposes an 
analytical framework for answering the fundamental question: 
How can we increase the responsiveness of decision-makers to 
the concerns of the poor and hold them accountable for their 
commitment to reducing poverty? The paper develops an 
approach to poverty reduction based on three interlinked 
concepts – voice, responsiveness, and accountability. Voice refers 
to the articulation of the concerns of the poor and their 
conversion into political demands. Responsiveness addresses the 
sensitivity of decision-makers to the voice of the poor and its 
expression in action or inaction. Accountability pertains to the 
relationship between bearers of rights and legitimate claims and 
the agents responsible for fulfilling those rights and claims. The 
authors distinguish between an array of agents with poverty-
reducing mandates or obligations. Furthermore they suggest 
schema for assessing the means whereby the voice of the poor 
can be heard better, for reviewing the mechanisms for enhancing 
the responsiveness of decision-makers to the plight of the poor, 
and for increasing accountability to the commitment to poverty 
reduction. The paper raises a number of questions for discussion 
and interspersed in the text are boxes with examples pointing to 
ways forward. The paper was first developed as the issues paper 
of the conference: ‘Responsiveness and accountability for poverty 
reduction: Democratic governance and the Millennium 
Development Goals’, jointly organised by UNDP, Oslo 
Governance Centre and the Chr. Michelsen Institute at Solstrand 
Fjord Hotel, Os, Norway,  18-19 November 2002. 
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